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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HOWARD B. ERICKSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 9973

ROBERT L. POULSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEThiENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff for Breach of
\Varranty to recover damages or the purchase price
paid for a Ponies of America Stallion by the name of
''Apple Jack" purchased under the Sales Act of Utah,
upon the Complaint of the Plaintiff alleging among
other things a Breech of Warranty of fittness for purpose, which Defendant in his Answer denied.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court, sitting without a
jury from a Judgment for Defendant of no cause of
action. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint,
Plaintiff appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the J udginent, and J udgment in Plaintiff's favor as a matter of law .
STATEMENT' OF FACTS
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages
or the purchase price paid for a P. 0. A. Stallion by the
name of ''Apple Jack.''
The Trial Court' found that the sale to Plaintiff
was made on the 29th day of May, 1961, and that Plaintiff paid the sum of $1500 to Defendant for the stallion,
and that as a result of the sterlity of the P. 0. A. Stallion, Plaintiff incurred $24 veterinarian expenses and
$100 a.s expenses for breeding and caring for the horse.
(Trial Court's Findings, paragraph No. 1, Amendment
to Findings, dated the 16th day of July, 1963, paragraph
14.)
The findings of the Court (twice amended by the
Court) established that both parties to the sale knew
prior to the sale that the horse was to be used by Plaintiff for breeding purposes. The horse after the sale was
transported to Hamilton, ~1ontana, the residence of the
Plaintiff, wliere it was found, by the Plaintiff, to be
incapable of begetting offspring and was unfit for the
purposes for which it was purchased by Plaintiff. (Trial
Court's Amended Findings, dated the 16th day of July,
1963, Paragraphs No. 10, 11, 12, and 13.)
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The Court found that while" Apple Jack" was able
to impregnate one mare prior to the sale, that after the
sale he was then unable to impregnate Plaintiff's mares.
The Court was then unable to make any finding as to
whether the animal was in fact infertile at the time of
sale. (Trial Court's findings, Paragraph No.15 as amended on the 16th day of July, 1963.)
From the Findings of Fact the Court concluded in
the Court's Conclusions of Law that the Court from the
evidence could not predicate the finding of alleged unfitness at the time of the sale of "Apple Jack" to the
Plaintiff. The Court further concluded that no rescission
was attempted within a reasonable time after Plaintiff
was put on notice as to "Apple Jack's" claimed infertility and that Plaintiff made no offer to deliver the
stallion in as good or equal condition as it was then received by Plaintiff, and that "Apple Jack's" death was
not caused in any way by resaon of the claim of ''Apple
Jack's" incapability to impregnate mares. By reason
thereof, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had no cause
of action against the Defendant. (Court's Conclusions
of Law, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4, and paragraph No.5
as amended on the 16th day of July, 1963.)
ARGUMENT
Point 1. The Trial Court erred in its Conclusion of
Law Xo. 5 as found in the Amended Conclusions of Law
dated the 16th day of July, 1963.
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The Finding of Fact, Paragraph No. 10 as amended
on the 16th day of July, 1963, states that Defendant represented the stallion as fit and capable of producing offspring. That at the time the defendant knew it was the
intention of Plaintiff to purchase the P. 0. A. Stallion
for breeding purposes, and that the Plaintiff relied upon
the representations, knowledge, and integrity of the
Defendant. (Findings No. 11 and 12.)
The Finding of Fact, Paragraph No. 13, was amended on the 16th day of July, 1963, states that the sta1lion
was incapable of begetting offspring and was unfit for
the purpose for which it wa3 purchased.
Taking these Findings of Fact, the Court concluded
in its Conclusions of Law, that there was not sufficient
evidence presented by the Plaintiff to find the unfitness
of the stallion as of the time of sale.
Other Courts have not had the same troubles. See
Eden vs. Vloedman, 214 P 2d, 930, where the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in 1949, held that a seller of cows warranted that the~T were fit for breeding purposes, and immediately after the sale they began to calf prematurely
because they were infected with banks disease, the warranty was breached even if the defect was not fully developed at the time of sale, the Court allowing in evidence
the statement of a veterinary eight months after the sale
of said cattle that he examined ten head of said cattle,
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picked at random and found them affected with bangs
disease.
In Mousel vs. Widker, 69 NW 2d, 783, the case appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota in 1955,
where the Trial Court's failure to give certain instructions on an implied warranty, the North Dakota Supreme
Court stated, citing other cases, that where an animal
is purchased for breeding purposes and the seller as
w~ll as the buyer knew that the animal was purchased for
breeding purposes, and the purchaser introduced evidence showing sterlity, the general rule pronounced by
the Courts is that in such sales there is an implied warranty available as a basis for action, that the thing purchased is reasonably suitable for the purpose for which
it is to be used. In the case of Mousel vs. Widker 2 the
Court cited the case of Peterson vs. Dreher, 194 NW. 53.
46 Am. Jur., page 573, states that testimony of third
persons who examine the horse immediately after its
sale and while in buyer's possession is admissable to
prove unsoundness at the time of sale, absent any evidence introduced that would tend to show that purchaser
was in some manner responsible for the sterlity or infertility as the case may be.
In the case of Studebaker Brothers Co., vs. Anderson, 50 rt. 319, 67 P. 663, this Court held that the
unfitness of an automobile was proved by evidence showing that the automobile was not fit for the purpose when
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it was in the possession of the purchaser. The case does
not make note nor consider the question of whether or
not the car was fit at the time of the sale, but bases its
decision upon the fitness of the automobile while in the
possession of the purchaser . . . implying that fitness
at the instant the sale takes place is not a necessary
requisite to the maintenance of the action.
(See further in this regard 53 A. L. R. 2d, 844; 77
C. J. S. 1188; and Balch vs. Newberry, 252 P. 2d, 153,
Oklamoho, 1953.)
As a further argument, the Trial Court did not find
that there was a change in the physical condition of the
stallion after the sale and before arrival in Hamilton,
:Montana, where it was found to be unfit by the Plaintiff.
Absence of such a finding would predicate only one finding: That the stallion must have been in the same condition at the time of the sale, notwithstanding Finding
of Fact No. 5, and the nebulous No. 9, which were made
before Plaintiff's motion to amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and should be regarded as amended
as they are inconsistent with the later Findings of Fact,
Paragraph 13, and the Judge's Memorandum Decision.
Point 2. That the Trial Court erred in making Conclusions of Law, No. 4, and the Judgment.
The Conclusions of Law and the Findings of Fact
are not consistent. The Judgment, although supported
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the Concluaions of Law, is not supported by the Findings of Fact. In the case of Mason vs. Mason, 160 P. 2d,
730, 108, Utah, 428, this Court said as follows:
''It is fundamental that the Conclusions of Law
must be predicated and find their support in the
Findings of Fact, and the Judgment 1nust follow
the conclusions of Law, and if the Conclusions
of Law are at variance with the findings, the Supreme Court will order the lower court to set
aside its erroneous conclusions and substitute
correct ones therefor."

For further cases see: Parrot Brothers vs. Ogden
City, 50 Utah, 512, 167 P. 807; and again we find Brittian
vs Gorman, 42 Utah, 586, 133 P. 370, where this Court
said: That Conclusions of Law must be based upon the
facts and must be considered with the facts, and in a
like fashion the Court's decree must rest upon legal
conclusions and be consistent with them. A judgment,
if in conformity with the findings, will not be distributed;
and of course, the converse is true. A judgment not in
conformity with the findings cannot be permitted to
stand.
In the last above cited case, the Judgment was vacated and set aside and the case remanded to the District
Court with inatructions to make and enter additional
findings, if necessary, conclusions of law supported by
the findings, and a decree in harmony with the opinion.
The Plaintiff-Appellant cites the Mason case supra,
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the Parrot Brothers Company case supra, and the Brittian case supra, as authority for error in that the judgment in the case at bar denies Plaintiff relief, yet the
Findings of Fact and the J\iemorandum of the Judge
clearly states that the Court finds the facts and makes
the legal conclusions in accordance with Plaintiff's
theory of the case, except for the fact that the Court
found Plaintiff delayed in attempting to rescind the contract.
The second reason, wherein Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that the Trial Court erred in making is Conclusions
of Law, is the fact that the Court denied Plaintiff recovery as found in the Judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, apparently predicating its decision upon
the fact that the Plaintiff did not attempt rescission upon
a reasonable time after Plaintiff was put on notice of
"Apple Jack's" infertility. The question is one dealing
with election of remedies.
In the case of Balch vs. Newberry, cited supra, upon
the filing of a complaint by the Plaintiff, the Defendant
filed a motion to elect demanding that the Plaintiff make
his election to sue for damages or to sue for the rescission of the contract.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff's complaint prays for
judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $1500,
being the purchase price of the horse, together with
various costs expended by Plaintiff. The second paraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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~raph i~

a prayer for rC's('ission of the contract of sale

for Bn•P<'h of Warranty and for damages stated in the
l'ir~t

paragraph. Plaintiff's prayer is double-barreled in

the rPsped that it first asks for damages and alternatively asks for rescission. The Defendant did not, as in the
<·a~P

of Balch vs. Newberry, supra, make or file any mo-

tion to compel Plaintiff to elect a remedy. At no time during the trial of the matter did the Defendant move for an
l'h·dion. 'rhe Trial Court apparently based its decision
upon reseission and did not consider the first paragraph
of

Plaintiff'~

prayer for relief based upon damages for

Hreerh of "~arrant~·. In this regard, the Trial Court
erred. S0etion 60-5-7, Ftah Code Annotated, 1953, states
that when the buyer has claimed and has been granted
a remed~· in any one of these ways, no other remedy is
available. At no tilne did the Defendant request Plaintiff to elect a remedy, nor was an election made other
than that found in the pleadings. The judgment of the
Court does not grant a remedy as it was made upon the
:1~~mnption that Plaintiff had elected rescission \vhen in
fact. Plaintiff's first prayer for relief contains a claim
t'or damages. In the case of !(ramer vs. K:. 0. Lee and
:--:on~. 237 X'r 166, where the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that: ''Though Plaintiff failed to rescind
within time, they are not necessarily shut off from all
remedy. 1t is only when they have claimed and have been
!.!Tnnted the remedy of recission under the provisions of
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Section 5591A (our Section 60-5-7, Sub 2 ,Utah Code Annotated, 1953) that this method is exclusive."
Quoting other cases :
"It is true that the complaint is based upon rescission and asks for the return of the purchase
price, but the counterclaim is in itself an action
brought by the Defendants against Plaintiffs and
the reply must be treated as an answer. In the
reply the Plaintiff realleges the allegations that
their signatures were obtained by fraud and deceit, and they asked for relief demanded in the
complaint; that is, the return of the purchase
price paid, together with the re-delivery of the
notes and mortgages. Having failed to show timely recission, Plaintiffs are relegated to their
right to damages as an offset to suit on the notes
and mortagages.''
So it is in the case that the Plaintiff, assuming that
he is barred from an action or recission, is not barred
from bringing an action in damages. See further 78
C. J. S. 144 where it is stated:
"It has been held that the buyer must elect between affirmance and rescission of the contract,
and that he is bound by his election. But it has
been held that an unsuccessful suit for the purchase price paid based in a rescission of the contract of sale does not preclude a recovery of damages, and that a buyer who has waived his right
to rescind ma~r sue for damages, and that a buyer
who has waived his claim for damages may rescind and reclaim the consideration paid. A buyer who elects to affirm the contract and sue for
damages has the entire period allowed h!' the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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::Statute of Linutat1ona 1n which to institute his
actwn, out a buyer who elects to rescmd must act
w1thm a reasonable tnne.''
1t 1s, tneretore, realleged. that the '.l'nal Court's

actwn ill c11~uuss1ng pla1ntllf 's complaint was untimely
and that t11e '.l'nal Court, although finding .Plainti:it
delayed too long to cmnmence an action for rescission
was entitled to receive da1nages Inasinuch as .t>laintiff
never claiined and had never been granted the remedy
lf rescission under the provisions of Section 60-5-7, Sub
~,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

The L! tah Supreme Court, in the case of Studebaker
Brothers Company, vs. Anderson, 50 Utah, 319 P. 663,
1916, held that the Defendant had the remedy of rescission of the contract but that was not the only remedy
the Defendants could invoke as the vendee had a right
to rescind the contract and recover back the purchase
price, or he may retain the article and hold the vendor
for his damages. The Court cited 28 Cyc. 44.
POlXT 3. That the Trial Court erred in making Con-

elusion of Law No. 3.
The firs two points conaidered in this brief consider
the errors of the Trial Court for failing to grant relief
to the Plaintiff on grounds not considered by that Court
or grounds inconsistently decided by that Court. This
Point concerns itself with the proposition that the Trial
Court erred in making the dPrision as found in the Judg-
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ment. For this argument only the record of the case ia
referred to and only that portion of the record dealing
with the conversations between Plaintiff and his wife
and the Defendant occuring after the sale. The findings
of the Court support the other facts considered. The
conclusion states that Plaintiff did not attempt to rescind
the contract within a reasonable time, yet the testimony
indicates the Defendant encouraged the Plaintiff to
keep the stallion, thereby waiving the provision for rescission after a reasonable time.
Mrs. Erickson, the wife of the Plaintiff, stated that
soon after the purchase of the horse and upon discovery
of his infertility, that during the conversation over the
telephone the defendant said, ''Just wait awhile and give
the horse a chance to mature since he was just a young
horse." That Mrs. Ericksen replied that she agreed to
take the advice of the Defendant. Thereafter, certain
letters wree written by the Plaintiff notifying Defendant
of the infertility of the stallion. (Transcript page 54,
lines 12-18, Transcript page 255.)
Mr. J\tfereness, a witness for Defendant, testified that
he, under the direction of the Defendant, took another
stallion to the Plaintiff's ranch for breeding purposes.
(Transcript page 193 and Transcript page 205.)
Doctor Poulsen ad1nitted the fact of the telephone
call, and stated in his testimony that with time the horse
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would get maturity and breed. (Transcript page 218,
line 15.)
It would appear from the record that there is un-

eontradicted evidence of notification by Plaintiff to
Defendant soon after the sale on May 29, 1961, and that
at Defendant's request and advice Plaintiff retained the
animal, which subsequently died from causes apart from
hi~

infertility. There is little doubt from the letters in

evidence as to the question of attempted rescission after
the death of the horse.
Section 60-5-7 (5) states that:
'·Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale
and elects to do so, if the seller refuses to accept
an offer of the buyer to return the goods, the
buyer shall thereafter be deemed to hold the
gooda as bailee ... "
Sub-paragraph 3 of the same action states th~t
where the goods have been delivered the buyer cannot
rescind the contract if he fails to notify the seller within
a reasonoble time of his election to rescind, or to offer
to return the goods in substantially the same condition.
These sub sectiona state that only notification and an
offer are requisites and not the filing of complaints
claiming rescission and physical delivery of the property
to the door of the seller. The evidence shows that there
wa~ notification and that Defendant requested Plaintiff
to keep the horse •'awhile'' and now Defendant main-
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tains that Plaintiff waited too long. The Trial Court
erred in holding that on unreasonable time had passed.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is urged that the decision of the
Lower Court be reversed. Directions to enter judgment
in favor of Plaintiff as prayed for in his complaint,
firstly for damages and secondly and alternatively for
rescission of the contract.
By inference, the Trial Court has barred Plaintiff's
recovery by way of damages and specifically barred
Plaintiff' 3 recovery by way of rescission for the Breech
of Warranty which was error. The Appellant herein does
not claim both remidies, and realizes that only one remedy
may be granted. Therefore, Plaintiff asserts to this
Honorable Court his right for damages as set forth in
the first paragraph of Plaintiff's prayer, and in the
alternative for rescission a~ set forth in the second paragraph of Plaintiff's prayer for relief.
As a concluding remark, Plaintiff cites to the Court
the memadandum decision of the Judge, upon which
the original Findings of Fact should have been predicated, which states as follows:
''That Plaintiff cannot recover in this action because he delayed too long after ascertaining that
''Apple Jack'' could not impregnate the mare3
before he attempted to rescind."
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Again in the memorandum it is said:
'• Except for the foregoing, the Court finds
facts and makes legal conclusions in accordance
with Plaintiff's theory of the case. Findings of
Fad, Conclusions and a Judgment dismissing
the action may be prepared because rescission
wa~ not attempted within a reasonable time after
Plaintiff was put on notice as to" Apple Jack's"
infertility.''
The thinking of the Trial Court was with the Plaintiff and the Findings of Fact as amended reaffirm this
fact. Cases need not be cited wherein it is stated that
the Supreme Court will not alter the findings of the
Trial Court if there is reasonable evidence to support
the findings. Plaintiff-Appellant does not in any manner
contest the findings, but reaffrms to this Court as a
matter of law the Trial Court erred in making its conclusions from the Findings.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE D. PRESTON
GEORGEW.PRESTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Appellant
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